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DOES THE ARMY NEED THE THEATER SUPPORT VESSEL? IF SO, HOW MANY?
This paper will examine the Army's watercraft transportation requirements called for in
Army Transformation policy, current capabilities provided by the Army Transportation Corps' watercraft fleet, and identified shortfalls. Using what planners believe to be the most likely future conflict scenarios, the paper will discuss challenges the Army faces deploying its forces to meet these potential future threats and the Army's recommended solution: the Theater Support Vessel (TSV). My conclusion will answer the question "Does the Army need the Theater Support Vessel? If so, how many?".
BACKGROUND FUTURE FORCE TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS.
In order for the Army to be relevant and ready it must transform from its Cold War structure to one that is increasingly flexible, sustainable, and rapidly deployable. To this last point, Army Transformation is focused on creating a future force which is capable of rapid unit deployments both for early entry and follow-on forces. To be relevant, these units must be able to deploy with full combat capabilities anywhere within the timelines established in the Army Transformation Vision 1 . Army Transformation will also require transforming our system for strategic and operational mobility.
There are several documents which are drivers to transform watercraft lift. The National Security Strategy (NSS) states "This broad portfolio of military capabilities must also include the ability to …ensure U.S. access to distant theaters… 2 . There is a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) operational goal which states "Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant antiaccess or area denial environment and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats… 3 . The
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) mandates "Requires forces with strategic agility" and "defeating or avoiding anti-access and area denial challenges by using multiple entry points in undeveloped regions" 4 .
Eighty percent of all countries border on the coast, 80 percent of the world's capitols lie within 350 miles of the coast, and 95 percent of all the world's population lives within 500 miles of the coast. Because of this, the use of coastal ingress to theaters provides many advantages which could be exploited by a high-speed shallow-draft intra-theater sealift vessel 5 The Army has the intra-theater requirement to transport forces, equipment, and sustainment in support of combat operations and other National Military and Security objectives.
To this end, new Army intra-theater sealift capabilities must be developed as an essential component of the future force. The current Army watercraft fleet is reaching the end of its economic useful life, has an old design, and its speed does not enable it to meet the Army's new deployment timelines 6 . The future force must be capable of deploying a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in 96 hours after wheels up (APOE or SPOE). It must be able to build a force into a warfighting division on the ground within 120 hours, and assemble 5 combat divisions in theater in 30 days. The demand on strategic mobility assets to accomplish this mission is overwhelming. Additionally, the increased demand to move forces by intra-theater lift and sustain them in a timely fashion will require new capabilities.
The Army is not facing a transportation problem for the first time in its 229 year history. In planning for the invasion of Europe during World War II, the Army required enough lift to move the massive invasion force from England to the beaches of France. "It did not make sense to build up a more massive attacking force without a reasonable hope of having in hand enough assault craft to lift it. Assault shipping, above all the LST, remained the crux of the problem, and the key to its solution was in the hands of the Americans…" 7 . American shipyards were able to surge and build not only enough Landing Ships Tank (LST) for the European invasion force but also enough for the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific.
In order to address transportation shortfalls, 9 . This movement was the equivalent of 4 1/2 C-5 loads or 6 C-17 loads. The military is encouraging major commercial developers of high-speed sealift to incorporate military useful features such as strengthened decks to support tracked vehicles and a stern ramp for austere ports. The idea is have these vessels serve as an inexpensive "active ready reserve force." 10 Another benefit of using this type of vessel for intra-theater lift is that they reduce in-theater logistics, thereby reducing strategic lift requirements without degrading the sustainability of the force. They do this by moving the personnel with the equipment without relying on strategic airlift from CONUS for example.
Advocates of the TSV believe in many ways the TSV reflects the essence of Army Transformation 11 . As currently configured, the TSV will be suitable for the current, interim, and future force. Unlike current deployment platforms, the TSV will be able to deliver combat forces autonomously, planning and rehearsing en route, as the situation at the destination may change, and arriving at the destination capable of immediate action even in the absence of developed infrastructure 12 . As a TSV advocate, MG Dail, a former Chief of Transportation, said "we're trying to get to the next level where we can be faster, where we can move equipment and the people and the leaders together, and reposition forces a lot faster" 13 . This means fielding a platform that the future force will need to fully achieve its capabilities for responsive application of ground combat power, without the benefit of world class air and sea ports. He also noted that the Army can quickly leverage off-the-shelf technology and capabilities to more economically acquire TSVs for the future force. The old acquisition paradigm takes much longer and results in extremely expensive, custom-made military equipment 14 .
CURRENT ARMY WATERCRAFT CAPABILITIES AND SHORTCOMINGS. The loss of this capability will place an extreme demand on air intra-theater assets. While this fleet's life could be extended, the design will not allow the addition of passenger space to allow concurrent lift of equipment with troops.
Another shortcoming of the current fleet is its speed -10 knots. This slow speed does not provide responsiveness and agility envisioned for the future force under the Army Transformation plan. The 10-knot speed also puts the crew at risk in a flat bottomed vessel with a bow ramp because this speed is too slow to evade adverse weather conditions which produce extreme sea states 20 . Neither the LSV nor the LCU-2000 is designed to carry passengers.
Therefore, the current fleet lacks the ability to deliver a combat ready force. The personnel assigned to the equipment the fleet would carry into a combat zone would have to use another intra-theater transportation mode to marry up with their combat systems. Additionally, the current fleet requires external materiel handling equipment (MHE) such as port cranes, floating cranes, or container handling equipment (CHE) to load/unload containers or palletized cargo.
This shortfall increases the support required at both the upload and discharge ports.
Programmed improvements for the current fleet are focused on vessel reliability and maintainability not speed, survivability, passenger capacity, or self-containment. The vessels' design prohibits these improvements, essentially making them economically unsuitable for modification to support interim and future force capabilities 21 . Therefore, current Army watercraft cannot meet the Army's Transformation objectives.
WATERCRAFT TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITIES REQUIRED TO MEET ARMY TRANSFORMATION GOALS.
In contrast to the shortfalls outlined for the Army's current watercraft fleet, future watercraft need the capability to carry personnel as well as their combat equipment, need to be fast, need to be more survivable, and need a self-sustaining cargo handling capability. The future watercraft must have a shallow draft and be small enough in length and beam in order to access an increased number of ports and have a RO/RO capability for the Army's heaviest equipment, the M1A2 tank, and be utilized in an austere port. This vessel must also have a large non-refuelable range in excess of 1000+ miles and have organic MHE to be self-sustaining. Finally, this vessel must have a C4ISR suite that will allow en route planning and rehearsals and be capable of receiving the latest intelligence updates all in a secure mode.
Another benefit of delivering troops ready to fight with their equipment is the elimination of the logistics footprint associated with Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (RSOI)
operations. All of these characteristics will allow the future force commander to employ forces over large distances attacking the enemy at a time or place he does not expect and in a manner for which he is unprepared to defend. This capability will give the future force commander an operational advantage 22 .
During the Vigilant Warriors 01 wargame, the U.S. and allied forces employed a mixture of current lift assets and promising future concepts. Of all current and future air and sea lift capabilities, shallow draft high-speed ships (SDHSS) and the Theater Support Vessel (TSV), because of their speed, throughput capability, and capacity most significantly impacted force closure rates 23 . SDHSS and TSVs were the only platforms that could deliver troops and equipment together in sufficient size to bring immediate combat power to bear. Additionally, while in transit, commanders could conduct en route mission planning and receive intelligence updates. The TSV also did not require a large fixed port because it could discharge its combat power at ports with 15 foot depths, greatly increasing the number of ports it could utilize without losing efficiency. The TSV provided transformational capability and operational maneuver of Army formations 24 . An additional benefit realized in the wargame was since the TSV can carry approximately 7 times as much as the C-17 and 24 times as much as the C-130, it had the added benefit of reducing intra-theater airlift requirements elsewhere in theater 25 .
MILITARY SIGNIFICANT PORTS AS POTENTIAL SEA PORTS OF DEBARKATION (SPOD).
The Department of Defense conducted a Worldwide Port Study "Quick Look" of potential SPODs in the Central Command (CENTCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM) areas of responsibility as these areas are viewed as most likely areas for future conflicts. Ports are considered militarily significant today if they can accommodate the LMSR which has a draft of 35 feet. Shallow draft sealift with a limited overall length provides the capability to access many more ports that are not considered militarily significant 26 . For example, in Korea, shallow draft vessels expand the amount of accessible ports by 84 percent 27 .
The significance of increasing port access in areas as volatile as Korea is key to providing commanders flexibility. LMSR capable ports are well known in Korea and are prime targets for conventional, unconventional, and potentially nuclear attack by the North Koreans. JLOTS operations in Korea west coastal areas are not practical due to high sea state conditions.
Shallow draft vessels expand access options greatly and provide the commander the flexibility required for future forces while giving a potential enemy many more access points to counter. This table indicates that the TSV can access about 74 percent of the 282 ports studied because its draft is between 4.6 and 6 meters. A LMSR can access only 27 percent of these same ports due to its draft of 9.1 to 10.5 meters. Also noted within the study was the length consideration. A TSV with a length of 121 meters (397 feet) can access 92 percent of these ports. Since depth limits TSV access to 74 percent of the ports, depth is the limiting factor 29 .
Country
The TSV nearly triples the number of ports available to the combatant commander greatly increasing operational flexibility.
COMPARISON OF CAPABILITIES OF CURRENT WATERCRAFT AND THE TSV.

SPEED, RANGE, CARGO CAPACITY, AND TROOP CARRYING CAPACITY.
The Army's current fleet of intra-theater watercraft has been optimized to transport current heavy forces in the traditional JLOTS bare beach operations and will not meet the needs of the transforming Army. Most significantly the difference between current Army watercraft and the TSV is that the TSV will transport combat ready units within a theater eliminating the need for RSOI of soldiers, vehicles and equipment within the battle space. This is a tremendous leap ahead in capability and goes a long way to reducing the in-theater logistics footprint. The TSV also reduces the need for weather dependent JLOTS operations because it can access many more ports than strategic sealift.
Unlike the current Army watercraft fleet, the TSV provides the commander intra-theater The LSV has only a bow ramp which limits its up/download capability while the TSV will have an astern M1A2 capable ramp with an up to 45-degree slewing angle capability 34 .
CREW SIZE AND COMPOSITION
The crew size for a TSV is equivalent that which currently crews the LSV: 31 crewmembers. The Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) of the LSV would be the same for a TSV. In leasing TSV-type vessels from Australian transportation firms, Army watercraft transportation personnel attended a short hands-on training course before crewing the vessel.
The U.S. Army transportation school can easily modify its curriculum to meet TSV crew requirements.
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON OF CURRENT WATERCRAFT FLEET AND THE TSV USING POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFLICT SCENARIOS.
KOREA CONFLICT 2010 (REPOSITIONING A SBCT FROM PUSAN TO INCHON).
In April 2003, a Quick Reaction Requirements Analysis for the Theater Support Vessel was completed which compared current Army watercraft and the TSV supporting intra-theater movement of a SBCT during a conflict in Korea in 2010 35 . The analysis used the SBCT currently being fielded and employed as a divisional brigade designed primarily for employment in Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) 36 . The SBCT is specifically designed as a highly mobile (strategic, operational, and tactical), early entry combat force and is intended to be able to reposition within 96 hours of "first wheels up" and begin operations immediately upon arrival at the POD 37 . At the operational level, the SBCT must be capable of intra-theater deployment by ground/sea or by C-130 air transport in order to provide the joint force commander the flexibility to employ the SBCT to exploit opportunities and hedge against uncertainty 38 .
In this scenario, the combatant commander ordered the SBCT to be moved by sealift from vicinity Pusan to vicinity Seoul to support coalition counter-offensive operations. The designated SPOD for this operation is Inchon. 
45
This scenario results in deploying the SBCT 99 percent faster and saves about $1.2 million in transport operational costs 46 .
The study also looked at the results of using pure fleets of C-17s and C-130s to deploy the SBCT from Naha, Japan (closest APOE to Okinawa, Japan) to Pusan, Korea, a total distance of 543 nautical miles. In this analysis, a notional fleet of 12 TSVs were used as an alternative to 12 C-17s and 120 C-130s. The analysis did account for the maximum on ground (MOG) constraints for arrival or departure airfields and seaports. The analysis concluded that fourteen sorties of the 12 TSVs could transport the SBCT in 2.9 days. In contrast, it took 800 C-130 sorties or 294 C-17 sorties to accomplish the same mission in the days indicated on the chart 48 . There was also a considerable transportation cost savings when the notional TSVs were used.
IMPACT OF BUYING THEATER SUPPORT VESSELS (TSV)
CREWING.
The crew size on an LSV is 31 personnel. This is the same crew required on the TSV. If The CAA study also noted that 7 TSVs represent an important threshold. This number of TSVs can deliver an entire SBCT up to 1,250 nautical miles (with 2 round trips) and that most of the potential future conflict areas are within the 1,250 nautical miles operational range given the stationing recommendation. 55 .
THE TSV AS A JOINT DEPLOYMENT PLATFORM.
ARMY MARINE CORPS BOARD 3-STAR REVIEW RESULTS.
The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is also studying the utility of using a High-Speed Shallow-Draft Vessel for its future operational requirements. A review of both programs determined they are very similar. The fast-ferry vessels currently leased by both services are of similar type, have similar characteristics, capabilities, and are envisioned doctrinally to be used in much the same way 56 . This Army Marine Corps Board (AMCB) 3-Star Review agreed that the services must proceed toward a joint program. They further determined that while the services' missions are different, the hull form is very similar. This indicates the potential to design a ship with a high degree of modularity to support the Marines as well as the Army, Navy, and SOCOM missions 57 .
The AMCB also discussed using the TSV to support the Navy's concept of Sea Basing.
Both services believe Sea Basing will be a crucial future Joint military capability for the U.S.
The board saw the TSV as a high priority development program to interface with the operational needs of sea bases 58 . The AMCB recommended developing a Joint Program Office, evolve a common Operational and Organizational plan, and provide a single interchangeable material solution 59 .
Requiring the TSV to become a "Joint Program" also fits the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) initiative of making the Army a more "Joint" service which is relevant and ready. The CSA wants to leverage new programs so that the services are more interdependent. The CSA's intent is better served by developing the TSV for both the Marines and the Army. Committee to coordinate and oversee high-speed vessel development and production.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
ARMY REQUIREMENT FOR TSVS.
Since the United States reduced its forward presence overseas at the end of the Cold War, the centerpiece of U.S. defense strategy has been power projection -the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in dispersed locations.
The commander of USTRANSCOM has said the U.S. Air Force has a requirement for 
CONCLUSION
The value a TSV gives the COCOM is getting a SBCT to the fight faster while increasing access options. It also allows en route planning and reduces the logistics footprint by eliminating the RSOI requirement. In short, the TSVs ability to rapidly transport combat-ready troops and equipment to a wide range of austere locations will make it a highly valuable asset to the theater commanders 63 .
The TSV brings a revolutionary capability to the way in which the Army deploys and fights.
In much the same way that wind powered ships were displaced by steam, fast monohull, bihull, or surface effect ships will displace today's large relatively slow vessels. The TSV is the first step forward in this era of fast ships. The Army is looking at this ship as an operational maneuver platform where soldiers and equipment are deployed in a ready to fight configuration, enabling the Deploy-Employ-Sustain (DES) concept. The TSV is envisioned to be used as an intra-theater deployment platform (up to 1250nm) and most probably the vessel and land side connector in the joint Sea Basing concept. With all of the above said, it is in the Army's best interest to invest in, buy, and man, at least 12 TSVs to support the Army's warfighting concept for the combatant commanders.
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